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NOTES
there held, to accomplish the policy of uniformity required by
the Erie case, that in a conflict of laws situation, also, burden of
proof would be treated as a substantive issue. Thereupon a sec-
ond qualification was involved; because the conflict of laws rules
of the state court qualified the matter as procedural, the federal
court then adopted that qualification and applied the internal
rule of that state. Apart from its significance for the points it
left undecided, the Sampson case is important in that the court,
despite the apparent confusion resulting from undescriptive
labels, adopted two different qualifications of the same point of
law in order to reach a desirable result. The realistic approach
to the problem of burden of proof in a conflict of laws case
furthers the policy expressed in the Erie case of preventing
choice of result through a selection of courts.
The Sampson case left undecided problems which will arise
if the conflict of laws rules of the state should qualify the mat-
ter as substantive. In that event the court will be faced with
the various possibilities of renvoi presented above. Until such
time as there is further litigation, these problems will remain
as matters of conjecture.
MiELVIN COHEN.
PERSONAL DISQUALIFICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATORS*
II. JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATIONS
Adverse Interest
The contention is often made that an applicant for letters of
administration is disqualified if he has an interest adverse to the
estate0 " which he wishes to administer. Thus the applicant may
be claiming property which is also claimed by the estate, 0 9 or
he may be a debtor of the estate,"" or he may be an adverse party
in a suit brought by the estate on a cause of action other than
debt."' Is the applicant disqualified by reason of these factors?
* Part I of this note, dealing with statutory disqualifications of admin-
istrators, appears at page 106, supra.
108. Adverse interest towards the other heirs of the intestate should not
disqualify since it is present in every case where there are two or more
heirs. Each heir is interested in seeing that the others get less in order
that his own share may be greater. The very fact that this interest exists
in almost every case demonstrates that it should not be a disqualification.
But see State ex rel. Wilson v. Martin (1930) 223 Mo. App. 1176, 26
S. W. (2d) 834, where this interest was considered by the trial court. The
appellate court did not, however, discuss this issue.
109. See In re Brundage's Estate (1904) 141 Cal. 538, 75 Pac. 175.
110. See In re Graham's Estate (1925) 27 Ariz. 167, 231 Pac. 918.
111. See Ellmaker's Estate (Pa. 1835) 4 Watts 34.
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Adverse interest arising from a claim to the property of the
estate does not come within the statutory disqualification for
want of integrity.112 The same is true of other kinds of adverse
interest.18 As a result, in the nineteen states'1 which hold the
statutory disqualifications exclusive and mandatory, adverse in-
terest is not a disqualification and the preferred applicant must
be appointed. n5 Only in those states in which the statutory dis-
qualifications are not exclusive and in which the court has dis-
cretion to add other disqualifications,116 is there any question of
an adverse claimant's eligibility.
It seems clear that an adverse claimant should not be ap-
pointed. He, as representative, will be too willing to admit that
he, as individual, has a just claim to the property, or that his
debt to the estate has been satisfied or is not recoverable. Of
course this danger is slightly lessened by the fact that the court
supervises the activities of the administrator. But before a court
can act it must be given facts, and obviously the adverse admin-
istrator will not be over-zealous to disclose personally detrimental
facts. The disclosure might be compelled before his appointment
in the hearing on his qualifications; but this would not insure
future candor, investigation, and prompt action. Creditors and
other distributees might be injured by this failure. In addition,
where litigation is pending between the estate and the appli-
cant, it is inappropriate to have the same party acting as both
plaintiff and defendant. 1 7
The majority of the courts recognize the validity of these argu-
ments and hold that the adverse claimant should not be ap-
112. Estate of Carmody (1891) 88 Cal. 616, 26 Pac. 373.
113. See In re Graham's Estate (1925) 27 Ariz. 167, 231 Pac. 918(debtor).
114. See notes 92 to 97, supra.
115. Marcus v. McKee (1934) 227 Ala. 577, 151 So. 456 (claimed prop-
erty) ; McFrey v. Casey (1924) 211 Ala. 649, 101 So. 449 (debtor); In reGraham's Estate (1925) 27 Ariz. 167, 231 Pac. 918 (debtor); In re
Brundage's Estate (1904) 141 Cal. 538, 75 Pac. 175 (claimed property);
Estate of Carmody (1891) 88 Cal. 616, 26 Pac. 373 (claimed property);
In re McLure's Estate (1922) 63 Mont. 536, 208 Pac. 900; In re Black-
burn (1913) 48 Mont. 179, 137 Pac. 381 (claimed property); In re Mc-Owens Estate (Surr. Ct. 1921) 114 Misc. 151, 185 N. Y. S. 907; Copper-field v. Shedd (1932) 158 Okla. 40, 10 P. (2d) 490 (party litigant). The
rule of the above California cases was changed by statute which expressly
gave the court the right to disqualify "for other cause" than those enu-
merated in the statute. After this amendment, adverse interest was held
to disqualify the applicant. In re St. John's Estate (1937) 8 Cal. (2d)
175, 64 P. (2d) 725 (claimed property).
116. See notes 95 to 107, supra.
117. See Spencer's Estate (1897) 7 Pa. Dist. Rep. 216.
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pointed." The very existence of a minority"19 is somewhat sur-
prising. It is interesting to note that the courts of Washington,
which hold its statute to be non-mandatory in spite of its ex-
press mandatory provisions,1-° are among this minority. If the
court's desire for discretion was so great that it would ignore
the statutory mandate, it is remarkable that it has not exercised
its discretion in this situation.
Massachusetts courts are among those holding that adverse
interest disqualifies. However, the adverse interest must be held
in a personal rather than representative capacity.121 Since the
bias of an individual is not apt to be greatly lessened by the fact
that he is acting in a representative rather than in an individual
capacity, it is submitted that this qualification is unsound.
2 2
In all states, including those in which adverse interest does
not constitute an absolute disqualification, the existence of this
interest will be considered by the court in choosing between two
otherwise equally qualified applicants, and the applicant free of
adverse interest will be appointed administrator. 2 3 It should be
noted, incidentally, that adverse interest is a more important
consideration than non-residence in those states where non-resi-
118. In re St. John's Estate (1937) 8 Cal. (2d) 175, 64 P. (2d) 725
(claimed property); Davis v. Davis (1925) 33 Ga. App. 628, 127 S. E.
779 (debtor); Moody v. Moody (1859) 29 Ga. 519 (claimed property),
with which compare Sampson v. Sampson (1932) 44 Ga. App. 803, 163
S. E. 326 (claimed property); Hunt v. Crocker (1932) 246 Ky. 338, 55
S. W. (2d) 20 (claimed property); Stearns v. Fiske (Mass. 1836) 18 Pick.
24 (debtor); State to use of Miller's Adm'r v. Bidlingmaier (1853) 26 Mo.
483 (adm'r of adverse estate); Territory v. Valdez (1872) 1 N. M. 533
(debtor); Failor's Estate (1899) 10 Pa. Super. 253 (claimed property);
In re Bieber's Appeal (1849) 11 Pa. St. 157 (debtor); Ellmaker's Estate
(Pa. 1835) 4 Watts 34 (party litigant).
119. Ford v. Peck (1924) 116 Kan. 481, 227 Pac. 527 (debtor); Kearney
v. Turney (1867) 28 Md. 408 (debtor); Pendleton v. Pendleton (1846) 14
Miss. 448 (claimed cause of action); Buscher v. Buscher (1913) 72 Wash.
675, 131 Pac. 193 (claimed property).
120. See supra, note 97.
121. Morgan v. Morgan (1929) 267 Mass. 388, 166 N. E. 747. A re-
ceiver of a bankrupt's estate was appointed administrator of the bankrupt's
estate when the bankrupt died. The functions would obviously conflict.
122. See In re Clark's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1934) 152 Misc. 723, 274 N.
Y. S. 282, in which it was held that the applicant was disqualified by rea-
son of adverse interest existing between the guardian-applicant and the
estate of the deceased. Adverse interest was not present between the ward
of the guardian-applicant and the intestate estate. See State to use of
Miller's Adm'r v. Bidlingmaier (1853) 26 Mo. 483, in which the administra-
tor of one estate applied for letters of administration on the estate of the
first intestate's husband. The application was denied.
123. Succession of Virgets (1935) 182 La. 491, 162 So. 53, with which
compare Succession of Weis (1891) 43 La. Ann. 475, 9 So. 712; In re
Rouse's Estate (1918) 71 Okla. 296, 176 Pac. 954.
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dence does not constitute an absolute disqualification. Thus, other
things being equal, a non-resident is preferred to a resident ap-
plicant who has an interest adverse to the estate.124
Marftl Misconduct
Desertion. It is well settled that voluntary separation does not
deprive either spouse of the right to administer the other's
estate.s 5 There is, however, a conflict of authority where the
applicant has, without cause, deserted his or her spouse. Ala-
bama, in Brown v. Brown,12 held that abandonment is not a dis-
qualification, while New York has held that it is.127 In a Ken-
tucky case128 an abandoning spouse was denied the right to ad-
minister on the ground that she was a non-resident; in a West
Virginia case 121 the abandoning spouse was appointed, on the
ground that she was the natural guardian of the infant children
whom she had taken when deserting. The court intimated that
because of the abandonment she had no personal right to the
letters of administration. 30
How can this seeming conflict of authority be resolved? Should
a deserting husband or wife be entitled to administer the estate
of the abandoned spouse? Inasmuch as an administrator must
have an interest in the estate, the answer to this question turns
upon whether the deserter loses his right to the property of his
spouse by reason of the abandonment. If the right to the prop-
erty is lost, the right to administer is also lost. Statutes in some
states prohibit a spouse from sharing in the deceased spouse's
estate if he has without cause abandoned the decedent during the
latter's lifetime.' 3' Since the abandoning spouse, in such states,
no longer has an interest in the intestate's property, the right
to administer given by the statute is lost. A forfeiture statute of
124. Pickering v. Pendexter (1865) 46 N. H. 69.
125. Williams v. McConico (1855) 27 Ala. 572; In re Brueneman's
Estate (1939) 32 Cal. App. (2d) 606, 90 P. (2d) 323; Keadman v. Rose
(1879) 63 Ga. 458; In re Merrill's Estate (1935) 245 App. Div. 323, 281
N. Y. S. 424.
126. (1920) 204 Ala. 157, 85 So. 439. See Nichols v. Smith (1914) 186
Ala. 587, 65 So. 30.
127. In re Rechtschaffen's Estate (1938) 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d)
357. But cf. In re Schwartz's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1930) 138 Misc. 537, 246
N. Y. S. 478.
128. Radford v. Radford (Ky. 1837) 5 Dana 151.
129. In re Estate of Stolling (1918) 82 W. Va. 18, 95 S. E. 446.
130. A North Carolina statute provides that abandonment of the wife
deprives the husband of the right to administer the wife's estate. But
this is the only state having an express statutory disqualification on this
ground.
131. Atkinson, Wills (1937) 116, sec. 54. See In re Rechtschaffen's
Estate (1938) 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357.
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this type exists in New York,132 and its decision that abandon-
ment disqualifies can be thus explained. The Alabama case,
Brown v. Brown,13' is not inconsistent with this analysis, since
a forfeiture statute does not exist in that state.13 4 These deci-
sions show that abandonment is not a common law disqualifica-
tion.
It has been held that abandonment by a husband does not come
within the disqualification for improvidence or want of under-
standing. 13 5 It would seem, however, that the abandoning spouse
should be found wanting in integrity.13 This result is doubtful,
however, in view of the result obtained in cases involving other
misconduct, such as adultery and bigamy on the part of the wife,
which will be next considered.
Adultery. Adultery and bigamy do not disqualify the surviv-
ing spouse.37 They do not show lack of integrity within the
meaning of that statutory disqualification, 838 and apparently they
are not common law disqualifications which exist independently
of statute.1 9
Adultery should be sufficient to disqualify the surviving
spouse. Does it not show deficiencies in character which should
disqualify an aspirant to a fiduciary position? By statute in
North Carolina it is provided that an adulterous spouse living
apart from the other may not be appointed administrator of the
latter's estate. Finally, where a statute takes away an adulter-
ous spouse's interest in the estate of the other spouse, 40 dis-
qualification might be based on the theory that the applicant has
lost his or her pecuniary interest in the estate..4
132. 1 N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Decedent Estate Law, sec. 87.
133. (1920) 204 Ala. 157, 85 So. 439.
134. Nolen v. Doss (1901) 133 Ala. 259, 31 So. 969.
135. In re Schwartz's Estate (Surf. Ct. 1930) 138 Misc. 537, 246 N. Y.
S. 478. At the time of this decision, want of integrity was not a statutory
disqualification. The rule of this case has been changed by In re Recht-
schaffen's Estate (1938) 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357. The decision
in the latter case was based, however, on lack of financial interest in the
estate and not on a statutory disqualification.
136. But integrity is considered solely in reference to business rela-
tions. See supra, page 115.
137. Estate of Newman (1899) 124 Cal. 688, 57 Pac. 686; In re Deft-
man's Estate (1917) 195 Mich. 231, 161 N. W. 836; Coover's Appeal(1886) 52 Pa. St. 427; Bennett v. Howard (1893) 18 R. I. 384, 28 Atl.
333.
138. (1899) 124 Cal. 388, 57 Pac. 686.
139. In re Dettman's Estate (1917) 195 Mich. 231, 161 N. W. 836;
Coover's Appeal (1886) 52 Pa. St. 427; Bennett v. Howard (1893) 18 R. I.
384, 28 Atl. 333.
140. Atkinson, Wills (1937) 112-115, see. 54.
141. See supra, page 116.
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Miscellaneous
Business Experience. In those states in which the statutory
grounds of disqualification are exclusive, it is settled that an
applicant is not barred by lack of business experience. 14 2 But
business experience ending in misfortune may be a disqualifica-
tion. Thus, prior bankruptcy of an applicant is evidence of im-
providence.13
Even in those states in which the statutory grounds of dis-
qualification are not exclusive, lack of business experience does
not usually amount to a disqualification,14 while business failure
does.14 5 Of course, unusual circumstances may alter this result.
Thus, where control of a large insurance company is involved,
it is essential that the applicant have some business experience.14
Where the court is choosing between two applicants who are
otherwise equally qualified, the scales will be inclined in favor
of the applicant with a good business record, 4 7 while a business
failure will incline the scale in favor of the other applicant.1 48
142. Stouffer v. Stouffer (1909) 110 Md. 368, 72 Atl. 843. The Mary-
land courts might now reach a contrary result since the statute today is
not mandatory. Accord: In re Carney's Estate (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 615,
91 At]. 598; In re Stege's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1937) 164 Misc. 95, 299 N. Y.
S. 115.
143. Willis v. Jones (1875) 42 Md. 422; Coope v. Lowerre (N. Y. 1845)
1 Barb. Ch. 45; In re Ferguson (Surr. Ct. 1903) 41 Misc. 465, 84 N. Y. S.
1102. Cf. In re Brinckmann's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1915) 89 Misc. 41, 152
N. Y. S. 542, which held that loss of property did not show improvidence
so long as the loss could be ascribed to misfortune.
144. Maddox v. Maddox (1921) 27 Ga. App. 369, 108 S. E. 304; Wilkey's
Appeal (1885) 108 Pa. 567. In State ex rel. Wilson v. Martin (1930) 223
Mo. App. 1176, 26 S. W. (2d) 834, an applicant without business experi-
ence was disqualified by the court. It was stated that the applicant also
had an adverse interest towards the other heirs of the intestate. But this
is generally true. See note 108, supra. Adverse interest should only be a
disqualification when it is directed against the intestate's estate. In Stephen-
son v. Stephenson (1857) 49 N. C. 472, it was held that an illiterate person
without business experience was "incompetent" within the meaning of the
statute. In In re Pollard's Estate (1920) 105 Neb. 432, 181 N. W. 133, a
creditor without business experience was disqualified when the other, and
unpreferred, applicant showed that he had a favorable business experience.
145. Cornpropst's Appeal (1859) 33 Pa. 537, held that an insolvent
applicant was disqualified. Levan's Appeal (1886) 112 Pa. 294, 3 Atl. 804,
repeated this rule by way of dictum. But mere poverty of the applicant
does not disqualify. Bowersox's Appeal (1862) 100 Pa. 434, 45 Am. Rep.
387.
146. State ex rel. Gregory v. Henderson (1935) 230 Mo. App. 1, 88
S. W. (2d) 893.
147. Succession of Virgets (1935) 182 La. 491, 162 So. 53; Cramer v.
Sharp (1892) 49 N. J. Eq. 558, 24 Atl. 962.
148. Bell v. Mimiswood (1812) 2 Phillim. 22, 161 Eng. Rep. 1066. In
Iredale v. Ford and Bramworth (1859) 1 Sw. & Tr. 305, 164 Eng. Rep.
740, there were two applicants, each of whom was favored by one rule of
preference. The court held that the fact that the one applicant had been
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss2/15
Sentility. The fact that the applicant is aged49 or infirm 50 is
not a common law disqualification in any state if it appears that
he has sufficient understanding and capacity to execute the duties
of the trust. Of course, if the applicant does not have the "un-
derstanding" 15" required by some statutes, he cannot be ap-
pointed; but old age alone does not constitute such a want of
understanding -5
Hostility toward heirs. Where the statutes are mandatory, a
person entitled to letters of administration cannot be rejected
because of a hostile feeling toward the heirs.15 3 However, in
those states in which the statutory disqualifications are not ex-
elusive, a surviving spouse should not be appointed if he or she
is hostile toward the other distributees. 5 4 Where there is hos-
previously adjudged a bankrupt was sufficient reason to favor the other
applicant.
149. Halley v. Haney and Thompson (1826) 19 Ky. 141; Wilkey's Ap-
peal (1885) 108 Pa. 567. And see cases cited infra, note 153.
150. Mobley v. Mobley (1926) 149 Md. 401, 131 Atl. 770; Matter of
Berrien (1885) 3 Dem. Surr. (N. Y.) 263; In re Stege's Estate (Surr.
Ct. 1937) 164 Misc. 95, 299 N. Y. S. 115. But see Slay v. Davidson (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935) 88 S. W. (2d) 650, in which the trial court held that an
aged and infirm person was disqualified. The disqualified person then at-
tempted to nominate a person to act in his stead. The appellate court held
that he could not nominate, since the trial court had held that he could
not act as administrator. Evidently there was no appeal on the question
whether an infirm aged person was disqualified. And see State ex rel.
Wilson v. Martin (1930) 223 Mo. App. 1176, 26 S. W. (2d) 834, in which
an aged infirm applicant who was hostile towards the majority of the
heirs of the intestate was denied appointment. Which was the crucial
factor was not indicated.
151. See supra, page 114.
152. Estate of Wright (1918) 177 Cal. 274, 170 Pac. 610; Estate of
Berrien (N. Y. 1885) 3 Dem. Surr. 263; In re Stege's Estate (Surr.
263. In Johnson's Estate (1920) 182 Cal. 642, 189 Pac. 280, the applicant
was 83 years of age, suffered from hallucinations, and was forgetful. The
combination of these factors was held to show a want of understanding
within the statute. See Haughey v. Haughey (1920) 73 Ind. App. 318, 127
N. E. 454, in which the widow was passed by for several reasons, two of
which were old age and poor health.
153. Estate of Wright (1918) 177 Cal. 274, 170 Pac. 610; Dooley v.
Dooley (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 240 S. W. 1112. See Smith v. Lurty (1907)
107 Va. 548, 59 S. E. 403, in which hostility towards heirs was held to be
a disqualification although not made so by the statute involved. The court
did not recognize or deny that the statute was mandatory. But the effect
of the added disqualification was to make the statute discretionary only.
154. Martin v. Otis (1919) 233 Mass. 491, 124 N. E. 294, 6 A. L. R.
1340; In re Abramovitz's Estate (1936) 278 Mich. 271, 270 N. W. 294;
In re Messler's Estate (1938) 16 N. J. Misc. 434, 1 A. (2d) 322; In re
Friese's Estate (1935) 317 Pa. 86, 176 Atl. 225; Warner's Estate (1904)
207 Pa. 580, 57 At. 35, 99 Am. St. Rep. 804; Smith v. Lurty (1907) 107
Va. 548, 59 S. E. 403. Contra: Pingree's Estate (1929) 74 Utah 384, 279
Pac. 901. See Carpenter v. Wood (1902) 131 Mich. 314, 91 N. W. 162
(creditor denied appointment on the ground of hostility); State ex rel.
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tility throughout a class, as among children of the deceased, that
class will be disqualified and a disinterested third person ap-
pointed, even though he does not have an interest in the estate.115
EDWIN M. SCHAEFER, JR.
Wilson v. Martin (1930) 223 Mo. App. 1176, 26 S. W. (2d) 834 (brother of
intestate denied appointment because of old age, infirmity, and hostility
toward heirs); In re Stott's Estate (1925) 133 Wash. 100, 233 Pac. 280
(distributees denied appointment on the ground that they had a feeling of
hostility towards the creditors of the deceased).
155. In re Eva's Estate (1918) 93 Conn. 38, 104 Atl. 238 (applicant
was also a nonresident); In re Appointment of Administratrix (1893) 10
Ohio Dec. 731; Drew's Appeal (1878) 58 N. H. 319; Ellis v. Ellis (1919)
42 N. D. 535, 174 N. W. 76; In re Schmidt (1897) 183 Pa. 129, 38 Atl.
464; In re St. Martin's Estate (1934) 175 Wash. 285, 27 P. (2d) 326;
Bridgman v. Bridgman (1887) 30 W. Va. 212, 3 S. E. 580. Where the
class is disqualified, the nominees of the groups within the class will also
be denied appointment. In re Tracy's Estate (1932) 214 Iowa 881, 24 N. W.
309; McWilliams v. Anderson (1918) 102 Neb. 170, 166 N. W. 261.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss2/15
